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The Food and Drug Administration issued a ﬁnal rule in May 2002 to permit the Agency to approve drugs or license biological
products on the basis of animal eﬃcacy studies for use in ameliorating or preventing serious or life-threatening conditions caused
by exposure to lethal or permanently disabling toxic biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear substances. Only two drugs were
approved in the ﬁrst nine years of the “Animal Rule” despite massive investment by the federal government since 2001 to stimulate
development of medical countermeasures to biological threats. This article therefore examines the Food and Drug Administration
reviews made public after approval of those two drugs and the public discussion at the Agency’s Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory
CommitteeofonebiologicalproductunderdevelopmentundertheAnimalRule.Despitethepaucityofapproveddrugsorlicensed
biological products as medical countermeasures, several investigational drugs have been placed in the National Strategic Stockpile
for use as medical countermeasures, if needed.
1.Introduction
There is a risk in the post-September 11, 2001, world of
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack on the
United States, either on civilian populations or on military
forces. To support the development of medical counter-
measures (MCM) against such threats, the government has
invested an estimated $54 billion in civilian spending from
ﬁscal year 2001 through ﬁscal year 2010 [1]. Yet despite
this massive investment, the United States lacks the range of
MCMlistedintheHealthandHumanServicesPublicHealth
Emergency MCM Enterprise Implementation Plan [2].
In2002,theFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA)issued
what has become known as the “Animal Rule,” intended
to expedite the development of new drugs and biologic
products as MCM to chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats. The Animal Rule applies only to new drug
or biologic products for which deﬁnitive human eﬃcacy
studies cannot be conducted because it would be unethical
to deliberately expose healthy human volunteers to a lethal
or permanently disabling toxic biological, chemical, radio-
logical, or nuclear substance.
SincetheAnimalRulewasissued,onlytwodrugproducts
for humans have been approved by the FDA on the basis
of eﬃcacy studies in animals. This paper summarizes the
context in which the Animal Rule came into being, the
regulatory provisions of the Animal Rule, and the publically-
available information on how FDA has reviewed animal
eﬃcacy studies in support of drug or biologic product
applications for use in humans.
2.The MedicalThreats
In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran in a war that lasted
until August 1988. During the war, Iran reported that
Iraq used chemical weapons on Iranian soldiers. One of
the chemical-warfare instances reported by Iran, at Hoor-
ul-Huzwaizeh on March 13, 1984, was veriﬁed by an
international team of specialists dispatched to Iran by the
United Nations Secretary General. The evidence adduced
in the report by the UN team lends substantial credence
to Iranian allegations of Iraqi chemical warfare on at least
six other occasions during the period from February 26 to
March 17 of that year [3].2 Advances in Preventive Medicine
A decade later in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
An international coalition of countries deployed troops to
Saudi Arabia in preparation to liberate Kuwait. At that time,
Iraq was thought to possess biological as well as chemical
weapons.
In the decade following the ensuing Gulf War, the
United Nations passed 16 Security Council resolutions
calling for the complete elimination of Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction. The United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) was established to oversee Iraq’s compliance
withdestructionofchemical,biological,andmissileweapons
facilities [4]. UNSCOM learned that Iraq had ordered tons
of growth media from the British company Oxoid, whereas
Iraq’s hospital consumption of growth media was only 200
kilograms a year. Rihab Rashid Taha, an Iraqi microbiologist
educated in England, admitted to UNSCOM inspectors that
she had grown 19,000 liters of botulism and 8,000 liters
o fa n t h r a x ,a sw e l la ss m a l l e ra m o u n t so fo t h e rd a n g e r o u s
organisms. She also had conducted research with camel pox
virus, which raised fears that Iraq had planned to weaponize
smallpox virus.
On September 18, 2001, apparently unrelated to events
in Iraq, a letter was mailed from Trenton, New Jersey, to
NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw in New York City. The letter
contained a brown granular material that turned out to be
anthrax spores. The staﬀ member who opened the letter
developed cutaneous symptoms around September 29 and
sawadoctoronOctober1.Anotherlettercontaininganthrax
was mailed on September 18 to the New York Post, where
three employees developed cutaneous anthrax. Although
never recovered, three other letters are thought to have been
mailed at the same time to ABC News and CBS News in
New York and to the National Enquirer at the oﬃces of AMI
in Boca Raton, Florida. A photo editor at AMI developed
inhalation anthrax and died on October 5 [5].
On October 9, 2001, two more letters were mailed
from Trenton to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and
Senator Patrick Leahy in Washington, DC. Both senators
had expressed concerns about the administration’s proposed
“anti-terrorism” Patriot Act. These October 9 letters con-
tained anthrax spores in the form of a highly reﬁned, dry
white powder. Two workers at the Brentwood postal facility
nearWashingtondiedofinhalationalanthraxonOctober22.
In all, from the four recovered and three suspected letters,
ﬁve people died from inhalational anthrax and at least 22
others were infected but recovered from either cutaneous
or inhalational anthrax. Thousands of other people thought
to have been exposed to anthrax were placed on antibiotic
therapy [5].
Morethanayearlater,onFebruary5,2003,inremarksto
theUnited Nations Security Council, Secretaryof StateColin
Powell noted that it had taken less than a teaspoon of dry
anthrax to shut down the United States Senate [6].
In 2003, Al Qaeda issued a fatwa authorizing the use of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons against inﬁdels
[7]. In March 2005, the Robb-Silverman Report on Weapons
of Mass Destruction documented that Al Qaeda had a major
bioweapons eﬀort in Afghanistan as of 2003 [8].
3.ImpasseatFDAonMedicalCountermeasures
During the 1980s, the time of the Iraq/Iran war, the Army
wasinvestigatingpyridostigminebromide(PB)asapotential
protection against the nerve gas soman. The Army discussed
its promising animal results with FDA, which explained to
the Army in 1988 that it had no regulatory pathway to
approve the drug on the basis of animal studies.
In October 1990, in preparation for the Gulf War to
liberateKuwait,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)requested
of FDA that it establish authority to waive its requirement
for informed consent for use of investigational drugs [9].
In less than two months, FDA announced an interim ﬁnal
rule, Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics:
Determination that Informed Consent is Not Feasible [10].
One week later, DoD requested waivers for PB and anthrax
vaccine; 18 days after the request, FDA granted both waivers
[9]. Operation Desert Storm began 11 days after the waivers
were granted. Under orders, soldiers in combat took PB as
an experimental protection against the nerve gas soman.
After Kuwait was liberated, a number of veterans suﬀered
from undiagnosed illnesses which collectively came to be
known as “Gulf War Syndrome.” Veteran groups alleged
that the investigational drugs had caused these illnesses,
and a presidential advisory committee on gulf war veterans’
illnesses was established in 1995 [11].
In December 1992, FDA promulgated new regulations
to facilitate the development of treatments for acquired
immuno-deﬁciency syndrome (AIDS) based on surrogate
markers [12]. A surrogate marker, such as CD-4 white
blood cell counts, might respond rapidly to a new antiviral
treatment, whereas it could take years to evaluate the eﬀect
of the new antiviral drug on long term survival of AIDS
patients. These “Accelerated Approval” regulations required
that a surrogate marker must be reasonably likely to predict
clinical beneﬁt. The Army saw in this new regulation a path
forward for licensure of PB as a protection against Soman
nervegasandﬁledaNewDrugApplication(NDA)withFDA
in May, 1996.
Ten months later in March, 1997, Dr. Paul Leber, director
of the Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products
at FDA, disputed the Army’s claim that the surrogate
marker of their clinical trials was reasonably likely to predict
clinical beneﬁt for the intended military use. He argued that
the predictive power of the surrogate must be shown in
humansbeforeany“reasonableperson”couldpredictclinical
beneﬁt.Heconsideredthatextrapolationofclinicalbeneﬁtin
humans based on animal experiments was unjustiﬁed [13].
Dr. Robert Temple, director of the Oﬃce of Drug
Evaluation I at FDA, did not agree with what he read as
Dr. Leber’s essentially absolute conclusion that animal data
linkinginhibitionofbloodcholinesterasebyPBtoprotection
against nerve agents, together with human evidence of
inhibition of blood cholinesterase, could never be taken as
evidence of eﬀectiveness under regulations for Accelerated
Approval of New Drugs for Serious or Life-Threatening
Illnesses. In his memorandum of August 1998, Dr. Temple
noted: “As I wrote that part of the preamble, I agree with
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cholinesterase inhibition had not been shown by the Army
to be a reasonable surrogate for survival beneﬁt [13].
Dr. Leber replied by memorandum in September 1998,
noting that Dr. Temple was incorrect in his assertion
that he, Dr. Leber, wrote that animal data could “never”
be used as a basis for reaching a conclusion under the
Accelerated Approval regulations. Dr. Leber noted that his
memorandum spoke to why, from an epistemological and
scientiﬁc perspective, it would be imprudent to extrapolate
from an eﬀect observed in an animal model to a conclusion
about the eﬀectiveness of the intervention in humans [13].
4.FDA’s Response toChemical,Biological,
Radiological andNuclearThreats
4.1. The Animal Rule. In July 1997, FDA requested com-
ments on its proposed rule for Accessibility to New Drugs
for Use in Military and Civilian Exigencies When Traditional
Human Eﬃcacy Studies Are Not Feasible [14]. Speciﬁcally,
FDA asked the following questions.
(1) Should its rule permitting waiver of informed con-
sent in very limited circumstances involving military
exigencies be revoked or amended?
This question soon became moot.
(2)W hen,ifever ,isitethicaltoexposevolunteerstoto xic
substances for testing antidotes?
FDA received nine comments. One comment sug-
gested that the developers of these drugs, if they are
conﬁdent that the drugs are both safe and eﬀective,
should oﬀer themselves for ﬁnal testing of safety
and eﬃcacy. DoD strongly opposed testing of toxic
substances and also stated that testing of sublethal
dosesofthetoxicsubstanceswouldbeuninformative.
(3) What evidence of eﬃcacy, other than from human
trials,wouldbeappropriatetodemonstratethesafety
and eﬃcacy of products that may provide protection
against toxic chemical and biological substances?
FDA received nine comments, most of which did not
mention speciﬁc types of information that would be
needed for approval. The Public Citizen Litigation
Group rejected as illegal, without elaboration, the
idea that animal data could serve as the basis of
approval of an antidote.
This rulemaking was rendered moot by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal 1999, which authorized the
president to waive FDA’s informed consent requirements in
certain military situations. Consequently, in October 1999,
FDA revoked its 1990 interim ﬁnal rule and issued a new
interim ﬁnal rule, which established criteria and standards
for the president to apply [15].
Also in October 1999, FDA issued a proposed rule,
New Drug and Biological Products; Evidence Needed to
Demonstrate Eﬃcacy of New Drugs for Use Against Lethal
or Permanently Disabling Toxic Substances When Eﬃcacy
Studies in Humans Ethically Cannot Be Conducted [16].
The proposed rule would also apply when ﬁeld trials after
accidental or hostile exposure are not feasible. Human safety
studies would be needed to support licensure.
FDA received comments on the proposed rule from
only two pharmaceutical companies, one physician aﬃliated
with a university, and the National Institutes of Health. The
ﬁnal rule was issued in May 2002, with the revised title,
New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed
to Demonstrate Eﬀectiveness of New Drugs When Human
Eﬃcacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible [17].
This rule has become known as the Animal Rule. The
scope of the rule and the standards for eﬀectiveness are
reproduced below from the Code of Federal Regulations, as
the author, who formerly worked at FDA, studiously avoids
paraphrasing regulations:
TITLE 21–FOOD AND DRUGS
CHAPTER I–FOOD AND DRUG ADMINIS-
TRATION
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER D–DRUGS FOR HUMAN USE
PART 314 APPLICATIONS FOR FDA
APPROVAL TO MARKET A NEW DRUG
Subpart I—Approval of New Drugs When Human Eﬃcacy
Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible. (i) Sec. 314.600 Scope.
This subpart applies to certain new drug products that have
been studied for their safety and eﬃcacy in ameliorating or
preventing serious or life-threatening conditions caused by
exposure to lethal or permanently disabling toxic biological,
chemical, radiological, or nuclear substances. This subpart
applies only to those new drug products for which deﬁnitive
humaneﬃcacystudiescannotbeconductedbecauseitwould
beunethicaltodeliberatelyexposehealthyhumanvolunteers
to a lethal or permanently disabling toxic biological, chemi-
cal, radiological, or nuclear substance; ﬁeld trials to study the
product’s eﬀectiveness after an accidental or hostile exposure
have not been feasible.
(ii) Sec. 314.610 Approval based on evidence of eﬀective-
ness from studies in animals.
(a) FDA may grant marketing approval for a new drug
product for which safety has been established and for which
the requirements of 314.600 are met based on adequate
and well-controlled animal studies when the results of those
animal studies establish that the drug product is reasonably
likely to produce clinical beneﬁt in humans. In assessing
the suﬃciency of animal data, the agency may take into
account other data, including human data, available to the
agency.FDAwillrelyontheevidencefromstudiesinanimals
to provide substantial evidence of the eﬀectiveness of these
products only when
(1) there is a reasonably well-understood pathophysio-
logical mechanism of the toxicity of the substance
and its prevention or substantial reduction by the
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(2) the eﬀect is demonstrated in more than one animal
species expected to react with a response predictive
for humans, unless the eﬀect is demonstrated in a
single animal species that represents a suﬃciently
well-characterized animal model for predicting the
response in humans;
(3) the animal study endpoint is clearly related to the
desired beneﬁt in humans, generally the enhance-
ment of survival or prevention of major morbidity;
(4) the data or information on the kinetics and pharma-
codynamics of the product or other relevant data or
information,inanimalsandhumans,allowsselection
of an eﬀective dose in humans.
To date, nine years after establishing the Animal Rule, no
biologic product has been licensed using this regulatory
pathway [18]. The two approvals under the Animal Rule
were for new indications for drugs that had previously been
approved for other indications. An analysis in 2008 of the
costs and likelihood of success for medical countermeasures
estimated the failure rate at more than 85% [19].
FDA’s budget request for FY 2012 includes the following
for medical countermeasures [18]:
FDA MCM Objective (1)—Enhance the Review
Process for MCM by Establishing Public Health
and Security Action Teams (PHSATs) (+$24,199,000/
85FTE);
FDA MCM Objective (2)—Advance Regulatory
Science for MCM Development and Evaluation
(+$36,903,000/60FTE);
FDA MCM Objective (3)—Modernize the Legal,
Regulatory, and Policy Framework for Eﬀective Pub-
lic Health Response (+$5,267,000/20FTE).
These requests for funding to enhance the review process
and advance the regulatory science for MCM at FDA suggest
that an ill-prepared FDA has somehow been responsible for
the slow process of bringing MCM to approval or licensure,
rather than that the chemistry, manufacturing and quality
controlofMCM,andtheeﬃcacyrequirementsoftheAnimal
Rule are themselves inherently diﬃcult.
4.2. FDA Background on Anthrax. FDA has been proactive
about the development of vaccines and therapeutics for
anthrax since the attacks of 2001:
(i) April 2002: FDA, the National Institute for Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, and the Department of
Defense sponsored a workshop on Anthrax Vaccines:
Eﬃcacy Testing and Surrogate Markers of Immunity
Workshop;
(ii) June 2004: FDA, the Centers for Disease Control,
and the National Institutes of Health sponsored a
workshop on Strategies for Developing Therapeutics
that Directly Target Anthrax and its Toxins;
(iii) November 2007: FDA, the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and the Department
of Health and Human Services Oﬃce of Biomedi-
cal Advanced Research and Development Authority
sponsoredaworkshoponAnthraxVaccines:Bridging
Correlates Of Protection In Animals To Immuno-
genicity In Humans;
(iv) November 2010: FDA’s Vaccines and Related Bio-
logical Products Advisory Committee considered the
Pathway to Licensure for Protective Antigen-based
Anthrax Vaccines for a Postexposure Prophylaxis
Indication Using the Animal Rule.
The 2004 workshop on therapeutics included sessions on
(i) pathogenesis of B. anthracis;
(ii) in vitro characterization;
(iii) animal studies;
(iv) human testing; and
(v) challenges and opportunities in product develop-
ment.
The session on animal studies included the following.
(i) The Animal Rule applied Pyridostigmine for Nerve
Gas Exposure and Gentamicin for Plague.
(ii) GLP issues.
(iii) Animal eﬃcacy:
( a )s p e c i e s :m o u s e ,r a t ,h a m s t e r ,g u i n e ap i g ,r a b b i t ,
and nonhuman primate (cynomolgus rhesus),
(b) technical methods for animal studies.
(iv) Panel discussion.
FDA did not present its current thinking on animal eﬃcacy
studies in a prepared talk but rather addressed questions to
the panel. The FDA moderator recognized that antibiotic
therapieswouldlikelybeusedinconjunctionwithantibodies
and perhaps other classes of agents; therefore, he asked the
panel members how they envisioned designing eﬃcacy stud-
ies when more than one agent was being studied, in order to
identify the correct timing and dosing of the investigational
therapeutic for (a) the postexposure prophylaxis indication
and (b) the treatment indication.
The ﬁrst point made was that each agent needs to be
understood individually, before studying combinations, in
order to have a better idea about timing for the combination
protocol. The moderator responded by asking if it would
be suﬃcient to study each agent individually, to show that
each is better than a control, and the reply to that was it
will depend on what the product is expected to do. An
FDA representative on the panel noted that it could be
a complicated and resource-intensive matter to determine
whether an agent is synergistic or additive when used in
combination. An FDA representative not on the panel agreed
thatinthemorecomplicatedcaseoftreatment,asopposedto
prophylaxis, particularly if there is the potential of using the
agent in combination rather than individually, the developer
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to design the studies. He said that FDA was looking forward
tointeractingwiththosewhoaredevelopinginterventionsto
try to make the process as eﬃcient as possible.
Withregardtotimingoftreatmentinatherapeuticstudy,
an audience member asked if it would be reasonable to
treat cohorts of animals at successively later times, rather
than monitoring animals around the clock for fever. An
FDA representative on the panel replied that it depends on
what the study is trying to prove—if the developer wants
to say that an intervention should be used upon evidence
of fever, they would have to monitor their animals and
design the experiment contingent upon fever, because the
instructions for use would be based on evidence of fever.
Another audience member noted that he had heard nothing
abouttheactualclinicalmanifestationsoccurringinanimals,
nothing to help him design studies in animals that would
help to treat symptomatic anthrax. He noted that for some
of the models that had been discussed, after the animals
are infected with the agent, the next thing that is clinically
apparent is death, which is a little late to treat. He wanted to
hear about data from animal models that could be used for
designing studies for the treatment of symptomatic anthrax
infection.(Applausenotedinthetranscriptatthispoint.)An
FDArepresentativeagreedthattherewasalotofinformation
that was just not there.
Perhaps the most salient comment in all these public
venueswithrespecttotheAnimalRulewasatthe2007work-
shop in the form of the following quotation from statistician
George Box.
Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful
[20].
5. Approvals under the AnimalRule
5.1. Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB). PB was approved in the
United States in 1955 for the treatment of myasthenia gravis,
a rare neurological disorder of too few acetylcholine (ACh)
receptors resulting in muscle weakness. Acetylcholinesterase
(AChE) is widely present in the body and breaks down
ACh. PB is a reversible inhibitor of AChE and thus allows
ACh to remain present longer, resulting in improved muscle
strength. Too much PB, however, can result in too much
ACh, leading to chronically stimulated muscles that quickly
result in paralysis.
Soman is an irreversible inhibitor of AChE and can
similarly result in paralysis. When Soman initially binds
to AChE, it can be displaced by pralidoxime, but within
minutes the binding becomes irreversible. The beneﬁt of
PB in pretreatment for Soman poisoning stems from its
reversible binding to AChE, protecting some of the AChE
from inactivation by Soman. Pralidoxime and atropine must
be administered within minutes of Soman exposure. When
a PB molecule leaves an AChE molecule in the free state, any
residualSomanthatmightinitiallybindtothefreeAChEcan
be displaced by pralidoxime.
On 3 January 2003, barely seven months after the ﬁnal
Animal Rule was issued, the Army resubmitted its NDA for
PB to establish that the elements of the rule had been met.
On 5 February 2003, FDA approved the application with
indications and usage as follows.
Pyridostigmine bromide is indicated for pro-
phylaxisagainstthelethaleﬀectsofSomannerve
agent poisoning. Pyridostigmine is intended to
be used in conjunction with protective gar-
ments, including a gas mask and immediate
atropine and pralidoximine therapy at the ﬁrst
sign of nerve agent poisoning. Pyridostigmine
should be stopped at the ﬁrst sign of nerve agent
poisoning.
The evidence for the eﬀectiveness of pyridostig-
mine as prophylaxis against Soman-induced
toxicity was derived from animal studies alone.
There was nothing slow about FDA’s review and approval
of the Army’s application under the new Animal Rule.
Dr. Temple’s memorandum supporting approval noted that
there had been discussion and, to a degree, disagreement
about whether the expectations of the rule had been met and
the relevance of those data to humans.
Dr. Temple noted that there are good explanations,
supported by considerable data, carried out by many
investigators, of the apparent diﬀerences between animal
species in their protective ratio to PB (and their diﬀerent
sensitivities to Soman) that mitigate the concern arising
from the apparent minimal protection in some species. The
diﬀerence in protective ratios between monkeys/guinea pigs
and rodents/rabbits can be explained by diﬀerent levels
of a Soman-binding enzyme, carboxylesterase, in diﬀerent
species that protects these species (rodents in particular)
from Soman poisoning. Based on human carboxylesterase
levels, the response of humans to PB is thus far more likely
to be similar to that seen in monkeys and guinea pigs
(a substantial protection for Soman lethality) than to the
smaller protective ratio eﬀect in rabbits and rodents.
Dr. Temple noted that the data strongly support the
proposed mechanism of action of PB in protecting against
Soman toxicity (requirement 1) and lead to a conclusion that
the results in monkeys and guinea pigs will be predictive of
the results in humans (requirement 2). He thus concluded
that we do understand “reasonably well” the pathophysiol-
ogy of the protective eﬀect of PB and that the eﬀect seen in
monkeys and guinea pigs is in fact expected to be predictive
of an eﬀect in humans [21].
5.2. Cyanokit. Cyanokit is a lyophilized formulation of
hydroxocobalamin for use as an antidote in treating patients
with known or suspected cyanide poisoning. Cyanide dis-
places the hydroxyl group in hydroxocobalamin, resulting
in the formation of cyanocobalamin, which is vitamin B12.
Hydroxocobalamin has been an approved drug for decades
for treatment of vitamin B12 deﬁciency, albeit at thousands
of fold lower doses than used in Cyanokit. The currently
marketed generic form of hydroxocobalamin was approved
in 1978.
Cyanokit was granted marketing authorization in France
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retrospective studies in victims of smoke inhalation that
included blood sampling prior to hydroxocobalamin treat-
ment for measurement of cyanide levels, along with one
retrospective study in subjects who had been exposed to
cyanide by other than ﬁre or smoke. None of the studies were
placebo controlled, as expected when testing an antidote
anticipated by its mechanism of action to be eﬀective. The
study results indicated that many of the treated subjects
survived what would otherwise have been lethal doses of
cyanide. FDA considered that the lack of a comparator
limited the interpretation of these ﬁndings, concluding only
that the levels of cyanide in humans in the French studies
were similar to cyanide levels that are lethal in dogs. Survival
intheFrenchstudieswasverylowforsubjectswhopresented
in cardiac arrest, but quite high for subjects who were not in
cardiac arrest.
FDA requested that Merck Sant´ e consider seeking
approval of Cyanokit in the United States. In March 2001,
FDA met with Orphan Medical, Inc., which had entered into
a letter of intent with the Merck subsidiary. FDA’s medical
review of Cyanokit describes that the requirements for an
NDA were established at that meeting and several following
interactions and included eﬃcacy studies in animals con-
ducted in accordance with 21CFR 314 Subpart I. Orphan
Medical undertook the animal studies and submitted an
NDA with the expected results demonstrating eﬃcacy.
Cyanokit was approved in the United States in December
2006, based primarily on a single placebo-controlled study
in a single species (dogs) [22].
6.AnAlmost-ApprovedAnthraxAntidote
6.1. Commercial Development of an Anthrax Antidote. With
regard to developing medical countermeasures for treat-
ment of anthrax disease, Human Genome Sciences (HGS)
announced the following in press releases or in the brieﬁng
package for the October 2009 meeting of the Vaccines and
Related Biological Products Advisory Committee [23, 24].
(i) October 2002: pre-IND meeting between HGS and
FDA;
(ii) February 2003: use of protein and antibody drug
development capabilities to develop therapeutic can-
didates to address microbial targets including an-
thrax;
(iii) March 2003: discovery of a human monoclonal
a n t i b o d yd r u gt h a ti se ﬀective in protecting against
anthrax in multiple experimental models in animals;
(iv) May 2003: submitted IND to FDA;
(v) June 2003: clearance from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to begin human trials of
raxibacumab;
(vi) July 2003: initiation of clinical development of rax-
ibacumab for the prevention and treatment of an-
thrax infections;
(vii) August 2003: designation from the FDA for rax-
ibacumab as a Fast Track Product;
(viii) November: orphan drug designation for raxibacu-
mab granted by FDA;
(ix) March 2004: ﬁnding in the Phase 1 trial that
raxibacumab is safe and well tolerated in healthy
volunteers and achieved the blood levels predicted
by relevant animal models as necessary to aﬀord
signiﬁcant protection from the lethal eﬀects of the
anthrax toxin;
(x) 2004to2007:aseriesofmeetingswithFDAregarding
the additional animal eﬃcacy studies needed to
supportlicensureand/oruseintheStrategicNational
Stockpile. These interactions established;
(a) the requirement to demonstrate eﬃcacy in two
species (rabbits and monkeys);
(b) thattheanimalshadtohaveevidenceofsystem-
ic anthrax disease at the time of raxibacumab
administration for an indication in therapeutic
treatment;
(c) that serum protective antigen (PA) could be
used as a trigger for therapeutic treatment;
(d) that the antibiotic exposure in animals in the
raxibacumab/antibiotic combination studies
should approximate the exposure achieved by
the recommended dose in humans.
Agreement on the division of studies between those needed
to support submission of an IND by the CDC to use
raxibacumab in the Strategic National Stockpile and those
additional studies needed for licensure was also achieved.
During 2007, HGS submitted the protocols and analysis
plans for the rabbit and monkey eﬃcacy studies. The
protocols for the rabbit and monkey raxibacumab/antibiotic
combinationstudieswerecompletedinthesummerof2008.
(i) July 2005: publication of Phase 1 study results in
Clinical Infectious Diseases;
(ii) October2005: awardforatwo-phasecontracttosup-
ply raxibacumab to the United States Government.
Under the ﬁrst phase of the contract, HGS would
supply ten grams of raxibacumab to the Department
of Health and Human Services for comparative in
vitro and in vivo testing. Under the second phase of
thecontract,theGovernmenthadtheoptiontoorder
up to 100,000 doses of raxibacumab for the Strategic
National Stockpile;
(iii) June 2006: government exercised option to purchase
20,000 treatment courses of raxibacumab for the
Strategic National Stockpile;
(iv) October 2008: Pre-Biologics License Application
meeting with FDA;
(v) February 2009: commencement of delivery of 20,000
doses raxibacumab to the Strategic National Stock-
pile;
(vi) May 2009: submission of a Biologics License Applica-
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(vii) July2009:publicationinTheNewEnglandJournalof
Medicine of the results of two pivotal animal eﬃcacy
studies,whichshowedthelife-savingpotentialofrax-
ibacumab in the event of life-threatening inhalation
anthrax disease;
(viii) July 22, 2009: Government exercised option to pur-
chase additional 45,000 doses of raxibacumab for the
Strategic National Stockpile;
(ix) October 2009: consideration of the BLA for rax-
ibacumab at FDA’s Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory
Committee;
(x) November 2009: FDA issued Complete Response
Letter requesting additional information relating to
the BLA for raxibacumab;
(xi) March 2010: $180.2 million in sales of raxibacumab
to the Strategic National Stockpile in 2009 (the ﬁrst
product sales for the company);
(xii) January 2011: HGS working closely with FDA to
obtain approval of raxibacumab for the treatment of
inhalation;
(xiii) February 2011: $47.2 million in sales of raxibacumab
to the Strategic National Stockpile in 2010.
6.2. FDA Advisory Committee. In October 2009, FDA’s Anti-
Infective Drugs Advisory Committee convened to consider
the Biologics License Application from Human Genome
Sciences for raxibacumab injection, a monoclonal anti-
body product for treatment of inhalation anthrax [25].
At the outset of the meeting, FDA indicated that results
of inspections of bioanalytical assays for raxibacumab and
ciproﬂoxacin raised questions about the reliability of the
clinical pharmacology data. Therefore, FDA would discuss
neither pharmacokinetic or pharmacodynamic results nor
the selection of a human dose.
6.3. Human Genome Sciences’ Perspective. Dr. Sally Bolmer
of Human Genome Sciences presented results of anthrax
challengestudiesinNewZealandwhiterabbitsandcynomol-
gus monkeys, both well-characterized models of inhalational
anthrax. Raxibacumab doses of 20 and 40mg/kg achieved
concentrations that were at least as high as the highest PA
levels in anthrax-infected animals. The pivotal animal eﬃ-
cacy studies had parallel groups, with animals randomized
to raxibacumab or placebo. To mimic the human clinical
situation, other studies were conducted in which animals
in some of the treatment groups received antibiotics at
the onset of symptoms after anthrax challenge. Dr. Bolmer
noted, however, that the preamble to the Animal Rule
describes the need for a wide range of therapeutic options
for the treatment of bioterror pathogens and speciﬁcally
cites anthrax. She noted further that the preamble states
that there is no requirement for new therapies to provide
meaningful therapeutic beneﬁts to subjects over existing
therapies, nor does it require the toxic agent to be without
a proven treatment. Finally she reported that concomitant
administration of raxibacumab with antibiotics in animals
did not alter the antibiotic eﬃcacy or pharmacokinetics.
In other words, raxibacumab was eﬀective in the animal
models, and antibiotics were eﬀective in the animal models,
and there was no decrease in eﬀectivenesswhenraxibacumab
was administered with antibiotics. Dr. Bolmer concluded her
remarks by introducing Dr. Daniel Lucey, who was chief of
the Infectious Disease Service at the Washington Hospital
Center in Washington, DC, during the anthrax attacks in
2001.
Dr. Lucey noted that in controlled experimental settings,
antibiotics can achieve up to 100% survival but that in
real world clinical use antibiotics are not as successful.
He noted that in the United States in the 20th century,
mortality from inhalational anthrax was 90% with antibiotic
susceptible strains of anthrax [26]. In the anthrax attacks in
2001, survival was 55% in the 11 patients with inhalational
anthrax, and Dr. Lucey considered that more rapid blood
culture results, use of two or more antibiotics (ideally at least
onewhichcrossestheblood-brainbarrierinordertoprevent
or treat anthrax meningitis), and pleural ﬂuid drainage have
improved survival. Nevertheless, the mortality rate of 45%
was highly unacceptable, and he considered that an antitoxin
is needed as an additional treatment modality, because the
toxins still exert deleterious eﬀects after control of bacterial
replication with antibiotics.
Dr. Lucey went on to say that prior to the development
of symptoms, antibiotics were very eﬀective for postex-
posure prophylaxis in 2001. Even in the ﬁrst one to ﬁve
days of prodromal ﬂu-like symptoms, prompt treatment
with antibiotics may have great beneﬁt. In an inhalational
anthrax infection, the prodromal phase is followed by an
intermediate progressive phase characterized by bacteremia
and/or pleural eﬀusions and/or mediastinal adenopathy.
Lastly, progression to the late fulminant stage can occur
rapidly and lead to death within 6 to 24 hours. At this late
fulminant stage, there has been no demonstrated beneﬁt
from antibiotics alone, and all ﬁve patients in 2001 who
died had reached this stage. Finally, Dr. Lucey noted that
thetreatmentparadigmofusinganantitoxinincombination
with antimicrobials is well established for tetanus.
Dr. Thi-Sau Mignone of Human Genome Sciences
described the pivotal animal studies with raxibacumab in
detail. The challenge dose of anthrax was 200 times the LD50
(the dose that causes lethality in 50% of the animals). At
this dose, the majority of rabbits died between days 3 and
5 whereas the majority of monkeys died between days 4 and
6. Positive bacteremia and anthrax PA in blood occurred at
24 hours in the rabbits and at 36 hours in the monkeys.
A signiﬁcant rise in temperature was also seen in rabbits
at 24 hours, but monkeys have a strong diurnal rhythm,
and temperature rise was not observed at 36 hours. When
raxibacumab was administered at 40mg/kg at the onset of
these symptoms, 44% of the rabbits and 64% of the monkeys
survived.
The studies in which antibiotics and raxibacumab were
coadministered upon onset of symptoms, as would be
expected in clinical practice in humans, were conducted to
test whether raxibacumab would interfere with levoﬂoxacin
or ciproﬂoxacin. The studies were not designed to detect8 Advances in Preventive Medicine
superiority or noninferiority of the combined treatment to
treatment with the antibiotic alone but rather to detect supe-
riority of the combined treatment to placebo. In both rabbits
and monkeys, survival was statistically signiﬁcant higher
with combined raxibacumab and levoﬂoxacin (rabbits) or
ciproﬂoxacin (monkeys) than with placebo, but survival was
not diﬀerent between combined treatment and treatment
with the antibiotic alone.
In contrast to the animal models, in humans in the
anthrax attacks of 2001, symptoms developed 4 to 6 days
a f t e re x p o s u r e ,a n dd e a t ho c c u r r e d5t o8d a y sa f t e rt h e
appearance of symptoms, for a total time to death in the
range of 9 to 14 days.
Dr. Dan Hanﬂing, special advisor for emergency pre-
parednessandresponsefortheInovaHealthSystemandclin-
ical professor of emergency medicine at George Washington
University, reviewed the risk-beneﬁt proﬁle of raxibacumab.
He had been integrally involved in the emergency man-
agement response during the 2001 attacks in the national
Capitol region, during which time two postal workers were
successfully diagnosed and treated. He noted that over
33,000 people were treated with prophylactic antibiotics
after the 2001 attack and reported that the Commission
on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction had
recently warned that anthrax spores released by a crop duster
could kill more Americans than died during all of World
War II. Although Human Genome Sciences had not tested
antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax, he pointed out that
PA is highly conserved in all known strains of anthrax and
that raxibacumab would thus as a single agent be expected to
be eﬀective against antibiotic-resistant strains. He concluded
thatitisreasonabletopredictthatthebeneﬁttoriskproﬁlein
humans is strongly positive for raxibacumab as a treatment
for anthrax infection.
6.4.FDA’sPerspective. Dr.YuliyaYasinskaya,amedicaloﬃcer
intheDivisionofSpecialPathogensandTransplantProducts
at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, presented
an FDA perspective on the raxibacumab animal studies. She
pointed out that the animal studies were subject to several
limitations in predicting response in humans, among which
is the time of intervention, which could be diﬀerent between
animals in a controlled research environment and humans in
a clinical setting. Antibiotics were very eﬀective in the animal
studies, with close to 100% survival.
FDA was also quite concerned about the unexpected
ﬁnding of a greater incidence and severity of central nervous
system (CNS) lesions in raxibacumab-treated animals that
died compared to placebo animals that died. Dr. Yasinskaya
noted that although only a single rabbit and a single monkey
died in the combined treatment groups, there were high
grade CNS lesions in 100% of those animals, whereas in the
placebo group the incidence of high grade lesions was low.
Dr. Yasinskaya concluded that the question remains whether
in humans the addition of raxibacumab added to antibiotics
will provide either additional beneﬁt or additional risk. Due
to limitations of the animal studies, it remained uncertain
how long antibiotic treatment can be delayed and thus how
late raxibacumab might be able to provide improved survival
in these models.
6.5. Advisory Committee’s Perspectives. After much prelim-
inary discussion, the FDA questions were read and the
advisory committee voted as follows.
(1) Does the evidence from the animal models evalu-
ating raxibacumab at 40 mg/kg IV predict response
for treatment of humans with inhalational anthrax
disease? And if not, what additional studies should be
conducted?
One committee member interpreted the question to refer
to monotherapy. Another committee member noted that
the question could be taken to mean response at any time
postexposure or at any stage of clinical illness.
The committee voted 16 in favor, 7 opposed, with 1
abstention. Several of the committee members, whether they
voted in favor or opposed, expressed a desire to see data from
animal studies in which antibiotic treatment was not 100%
successful, either because doses would be more in keeping
with human doses or because timing of administration
would be delayed, so that additional beneﬁt of raxibacumab
could be observed if additional beneﬁt indeed exists. It was
noted that in a disaster situation, humans would probably
show up a week or more after their exposure, after they
probably have been PA positive for a while, a very diﬀerent
situation than the animal studies.
One committee member remarked that the wording of
the question was almost Talmudic, and the people who voted
in favor or opposed often had all the same reasons and all the
same concerns but wound upcoming down on one side or
the other of the fence. One committee member who voted
in favor commented she thought elements 1 through 3 of
the Animal Rule were met and that we should move forward
with this kind of drug. Several other committee members
who voted in favor stated that they narrowly interpreted
the question as referring to monotherapy with raxibacumab.
One committee member explained his opposition as due to
the wording of the question with respect to anthrax disease,
pointing out that appearance of PA in the blood of animals is
not anthrax disease.
(2) Does the evidence provided in these studies support
the conclusion that raxibacumab will not diminish
the anticipated eﬃcacy of antimicrobials in inhala-
tional anthrax? And if not, what additional studies
should be conducted?
One committee member immediately noted that FDA
had instructed the committee to ignore the pharmacokinetic
data, because of questions about their reliability. Therefore,
he asked how is the committee to answer this question if
ignoring the pharmacokinetic data? FDA suggested that he
should vote as he believed he could vote and then provide his
perspective as to why he took that vote and how he might
have voted depending on what kind of clinical data were
available.
T h ec o m m i t t e ev o t e d1 0i nf a v o r ,1 1o p p o s e d ,w i t h3
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explain his vote noted that there was a major control arm
missing, raxibacumab alone, so that it was very diﬃcult
for him to make that comparison. Another who voted in
opposition said that the antibiotics had been given in doses
so far above their therapeutic thresholds that if there was a
detrimental eﬀect of raxibacumab, it might not have been
seen in these studies. One committee member voted in favor
because he knew of no precedent for a protein therapeutic
like an antibody to alter the behavior of a small molecule
antimicrobial.Anotherwhovotedinfavorsaidthattherewas
no evidence to the contrary.
The statistician committee member calculated that it
would take about 400 animals to detect a statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between 95% survival in one group
versus 85% in the other. He considered that a study with that
number of animals sounded like a nonstarter. One member
said he abstained because he could not decide which way to
vote and that the committee vote had validated his feelings.
Eventually, one member said that he voted in opposition
because of the narrow construction of what was presented
and that he voted in favor (laughter noted in the transcript
at this point) because of the narrow construction that the
percentages were the same. Finally one member said that the
last time he looked in a biochemistry textbook, antibiotics
can be protein bound and that there was a serious matter
here and that the animals should be treated with antibiotics
at doses that we would use to treat a human being.
(3) Should evidence be requested that raxibacumab
makes a contribution to the eﬃcacy over the antimi-
crobial alone in rabbit and monkey models? If yes,
what types of additional studies should be requested
and then conducted?
The committee voted 17 in favor, 6 opposed, with 1
abstention. A common sentiment was that in additional
studies, the animals should be given the study material at
a time that is truly therapeutic and not prophylactic. One
member who voted in favor noted that the question did not
say who would conduct the studies and he was not sure that
the “poor sponsor” who had the misfortune of developing
this compound should have to do all those studies. Another
member who voted in favor thought that it might be a
diﬃcult bar for the sponsor to meet. A member who voted in
opposition pointed out that raxibacumab may have beneﬁt
as monotherapy if it is dosed correctly, although it would
be good to know if it could help rescue patients that had
delayed antibiotic therapy. Another member who voted in
opposition said it may be an unreasonable burden to say
raxibacumab is going to beneﬁt every patient who receives
it. He thought there was every reason to think raxibacumab
issafeandeﬃcaciousandwouldbeneﬁtasigniﬁcantfraction
of those who receive it.
(4) Do you have any recommendations how this (the
CNS ﬁndings) might be further evaluated?
Despite a number of committee members advocating
further studies in a meningitis model, one member pointed
out that their understanding was biased by the fact that the
only data were from nonsurviving animals. He noted that
the only way to determine whether there was causality would
b et ol o o ka ts u r v i v o r sa sw e l lt os e ei ft h e yh a v ea n yC N S
toxicity. A couple of committee members were concerned
about antibody complexes as potentially a source of toxicity.
(5) Are there additional comments or further recom-
mendations for safety evaluation in humans? If yes,
what are these recommendations?
One committee member recommended that some work
needs to be done to make sure that raxibacumab would be
safe for use in children, and another recommended that the
same level of assurance was needed for elderly patients.
7. Discussion
7.1. Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB). In 2008, the congression-
ally appointed Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War
Veterans’ Illnesses reported that roughly 25% of the 697,000
veterans were aﬄicted. Exposure to PB and pesticides
that were heavily used during the war was implicated as
contributing to the illnesses [27].
A National Academy of Sciences committee, however,
reviewed the evidence in the Research Advisory Committee’s
report and published in 2010 that human epidemiologic
evidence was not suﬃcient to establish a causative relation-
ship between any speciﬁc drug, toxin, plume, or other agent,
either alone or in combination, and Gulf War illness [28].
The Animal Rule was born of the controversy over
administration of investigational drugs and biologics to
soldiers under military orders without informed consent,
under an administrative rule for waiver of informed consent
in certain military exigencies. Now that PB has been licensed
by FDA under the Animal Rule, should there be future
military exigencies in which the use of Soman is anticipated,
informed consent would no longer be an issue in ordering
soldiers to take the licensed drug as a pretreatment against
possible attack. Thus the legal situation for use of PB has
changed, but the safety proﬁle of PB has of course not
changed at all because of its regulatory transition from an
investigational to a licensed drug.
7.2. Cyanokit. FDA considered the approval of Cyanokit to
have been based primarily on the dog study, despite the
fact that one prospective and several retrospective studies
had been conducted in humans. Apparently FDA was more
willing to extrapolate eﬃcacy from dogs to humans than it
wastomakeamedicaldecisionabouttheeﬃcacyofCyanokit
based on the open label studies in France. FDA appeared
reluctant to stray from its gold standard of randomized,
blinded, and placebo-controlled trials, apparently giving
more credence to statistical analyses of data from dogs than
to medical evidence from humans.
FDA could have compared the cyanide levels in the
French patients who were in cardiac arrest and died to the
cyanidelevelsinpatientswhowerenotincardiacarrestatthe
time of treatment and lived. It would not have been diﬃcult
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hadbaselinecyanidelevelsthatwerefatalinsubjectswhohad
progressedtocardiacarrestbeforetreatment,butFDAwould
h a v eh a dt oh a v ew a n t e dt os e ew h a tc o u l db el e a r n e df r o m
the French data. As noted above, FDA concluded only that
cyanide levels in the French patients were similar to cyanide
levels that are lethal in dogs and therefore was apparently
unwilling to make a medical decision based on evidence that
did not come with a gold star of statistical signiﬁcance. In
the end, more than ﬁve years after Merck Sant´ e was solicited
to seek approval and conducted a randomized, placebo-
controlledanimalstudy,FDAapprovedCyanokitaseﬀective,
as the French regulatory authority had already done on the
basis noncontrolled human studies.
7.3. Raxibacumab. Regarding the speciﬁc matter of CNS
toxicity, since raxibacumab does not cross an intact blood-
brain barrier, the basis for FDA’s concern is not completely
clear. After all, if raxibacumab is eﬀective in other tissues in
preventing damage from anthrax toxins, one might expect
delayed progression of disease in those tissues—and indeed
time to death was longer in the raxibacumab-treated animals
that died compared to placebo-treated animals that died—
thus leaving more time for lesions to develop in the brain.
In fact, in raxibacumab-treated rabbits in the pivotal study,
the incidence and severity of histopathology in nonsurvivors
were the same or lower than in placebo-treated rabbits for
all tissues except for the brain. In the lungs in particular,
the pathology was severe in the placebo-treated animals
but lower in the raxibacumab-treated animals. In the words
of Dr. Mignone, the CNS lesions were more likely due to
ad i ﬀerence in the site of beneﬁt for raxibacumab than
to an actual deleterious eﬀect. Even if the blood-brain
barrier is compromised as anthrax disease progresses and
raxibacumab then does enter the CNS, it is not clear why
some advisory committee members were concerned about
a monoclonal antibody forming immune complexes with
the PA protein, since raxibacumab binds only to a single
epitope on PA and would not be expected to cross-link the
PA proteins in brain.
Regarding the speciﬁc matter of antibiotic dosing in the
combination studies, the HGS brieﬁng package notes that
50mg/kg in the rabbit produces similar exposure to that
reported for the approved human doses of 500 or 750mg
levoﬂoxacin. Since many humans weigh between 50kg to
75kg, the human doses are thus in the range of 10mg/kg.
HGS was unable to rebut the advisory committee’s criticism
that they had used doses in the animals that were in excess
of the human doses, because FDA had taken any discussion
of the pharmacokinetic data oﬀ the table. Taking the brieﬁng
package statement about similar antibiotic exposure at face
value and recognizing that HGS and FDA had concurred
that the antibiotic exposure in animals should approximate
that of the recommended dose for humans, the advisory
committee’s criticism appears to have been misplaced.
Regarding the general matter of FDA providing guidance
to HGS during the entire course of clinical development
and speciﬁcally on the protocols for the animal studies,
it appears to be an awkward regulatory posture for FDA
to have prospectively concurred with the design of the
combination raxibacumab-antibiotic studies but then to
have retrospectively required that HGS needed to evaluate
whether or not raxibacumab provides additional beneﬁt
beyond that provided by antibiotics alone. The question
as to whether additional beneﬁt had to be demonstrated
for use of a new therapeutic intervention in combination
with antibiotics had been raised during the workshop in
2004, so FDA was very well aware of the matter. Further,
HGS had conducted a pilot study of levoﬂoxacin in rabbits
challenged with anthrax, with levoﬂoxacin dosing triggered
by rise in temperature. Levoﬂoxacin was quite eﬀective
at 10mg/kg, 25mg/kg, and 50mg/kg, the latter of which
in rabbits was found to be equivalent in exposure to the
approved human dosing. The results of this study had been
submitted to FDA and had predicted that survival would be
very high in the proposed combination study of levoﬂoxacin
and raxibacumab, meaning that an additional beneﬁt of
raxibacumab could not be detected, only as a detriment. One
can only assume from the outside that the FDA review team
decidedthatashowingofadditionalbeneﬁtforraxibacumab
beyond the beneﬁt of antibiotics alone was not necessary,
at the same time that they reviewed the HGS protocol
designedtoevaluatewhetherraxibacumabhadadetrimental
eﬀect on antibiotic eﬃcacy. The FDA recommendation at
the 2004 workshop for a developer to talk with the FDA
review division before commencing animal studies had years
later appeared in the January 2009 Draft Guidance for
Industry: Animal Models—Essential Elements to Address
Eﬃcacy Under the Animal Rule.
FDA strongly encourages sponsors to submit
a development plan and to communicate fre-
quently with the agency when developing prod-
ucts under the Animal Rule. The protocols for
the animal eﬃcacy studies should be discussed
with FDA, with suﬃc i e n tt i m ef o rF D Ar e v i e w
and comment, prior to the study being con-
ducted.
From HGS’s description of its interactions with FDA from
2004 to 2007 on the protocols for animal eﬃcacy studies,
it would appear that HGS comported with what is now
FDA guidance. On FDA’s side, after the workshop in 2004
on the very topic of Strategies for Developing Therapeutics
that Directly Target Anthrax and its Toxins, the review team
should have been better prepared for providing guidance to
HGS for development of raxibacumab than they appear to
have been.
8. Conclusions
In its FY 2012 budget request, FDA requested $36.9 million
for advancing regulatory science for MCM development
and evaluation, which amounts to funding for 60 full-time
equivalents. However, it was not lack of FDA personnel
that led to nonlicensure of raxibacumab, but rather lack of
forethought by FDA personnel as to whether HGS needed
to demonstrate that their antidote to anthrax toxin provides
additional beneﬁt to antibiotics for treatment of inhalational
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Tens of thousands of vials of raxibacumab now reside
in the Strategic National Stockpile, as investigational drugs,
a n dn od o u b tw o u l db eu s e di nt h ee v e n to ff u t u r ec a s e so f
patients with advanced inhalational anthrax disease. Clearly
there have been diﬀerent standards for national stockpiling
on one hand and for FDA approval of drugs or licensure
of biologics on the other as medical countermeasures
for biothreats. At least two other investigational biologic
drugs, Anthrax Immune Globulin and Botulism Antitoxin
Heptavalent, also reside in the Strategic National Stockpile
[29].
The Animal Rule was developed to provide a basis for
approving certain drugs or licensing certain biologic prod-
ucts as medical countermeasures to biological threats with-
out eﬃcacy data in humans, the alternative being to leave
these products languishing as investigational drugs that
require informed consent from human subjects prior to
use. Personally and for the sake of his children, the author
is relieved that promising medical countermeasures do not
need FDA approval or licensure in order to be produced in
large quantities and stockpiled for ready availability in the
event of a mass bioterror attack on the United States.
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